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Important water issues in South Africa relate to equity, efficiency of use, quality (return flow 
pollution) and instream uses such as the environment. Farmers in South Africa pay water rates 
whether or not water is used and water is not volumetric priced. Water markets can attach an 
opportunity cost price and scarcity value to water. Opportunity cost pricing by the state has 
received no support in the international economic literature largely because of estimation 
problems. Water markets have started to emerge in the Lower Orange River and in the Fish and 
Sunday's rivers in the Eastern Cape in South Africa but there are two reasons why agricultural 
water markets do not release water in South Africa. The first reason is that the only water trades 
that have taken place in these rivers are between non-users of water and intensive users. It may 
take time before all sleeper rights (water not used) are activated which is also the case in 
Australia. Secondly, irrigation farmers in South Africa along the Orange and Sunday’s rivers 
are permitted to irrigate a larger area if they adopt water saving technology such as drip 
irrigation. Although this water saving technologies will reduce water application per ha, the 
consumptive use of water per ha may not decrease and will increase if a larger area can be 
irrigated. Agricultural water markets are thus increasing the use of water and not promoting its 
conservation. It is thus recommended that transfers should be based on consumptive use if return 
flow is significant. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The new SA Water Act of 1998 provides the constitutional framework for future 
water markets in South Africa. Although the main reason for the Act is to address 
the equity issue, other issues are also important for instance that the environment 
should be protected and that water should be used as a scarce resource by the 
agricultural sector. These issues are interrelated and not always mutually 
exclusive and water markets and water institutions may be used to promote 
economic and social desirable objectives.  
 
Although technical water research has received high priority in the past in South 
Africa, little is known about the impacts of alternative water economic policies. 
South African water markets along with those of Australia and the Eastern USA 
are based on riparian ownership and are not as fully developed as those in the 
Western USA. Due to the scarcity of water in the Western USA, water markets 
have a long history of experience and dates back to a case by the Colorado 
Supreme Court in 1882 (Howe, 1998). The purpose in this research is to study the 
                                                 




experience of successes and unresolved challenges of Western water markets, 
with possible lessons for South Africa. This paper draws on institutional 
economics and is of an interdisciplinary nature. Future expected water scarcity in 
South Africa can be tackled by building more dams (supply side approach) or the 
more economic efficient use (demand side approach) of water. The latter 
approach is followed in this paper.  
 
2.  WATER MARKET DOCTRINES 
 
Water rights are generally based on one of three systems, public allocation, prior 
(appropriative) rights and riparian rights. Public allocation involves administered 
distribution of water. 
 
Prior water rights as practised in the Western USA are established by actual use 
while a distinction is made between senior rights and junior rights. According to 
the priority system, rights first established are senior. Senior rights usually held 
by agriculture must first be satisfied. The priority dates, diversionary entitlement, 
point of diversion, and place and purpose of use delimit appropriative water 
rights (Huffaker & Whittlesey, 1995). The water rights institution provides 
certainty in supply as senior (prior) rights are fulfilled before junior rights. Based 
on temporal priority, a water user can be relatively certain about receiving water 
in a give year.  
 
Riparian rights link ownership of, or reasonable use of water to ownership of 
adjacent lands while rights are a percentage of water available for irrigation.  The 
structure of water rights spreads the risk of variability equally among 
shareholders. 
 
The riparian doctrine only recognises rights of riparian landowners and the rights 
of other potential users are not protected by law. The new South African Water 
Act has changed this legal priority of rights and only water required to meet basic 
human needs and to maintain environmental sustainability will be guaranteed as 
a right (SA Water Law, 1998). Under the new SA Water Act, farmers will have to 
apply for licenses to use water. Licenses are not to exceed 40 years and water 
must be used beneficially. 
 
Under Riparian Water Law farmers have water rights whether or not rights are 
exercised. SA farmers have to pay water rates on registered riparian land whether 
water was actually applied or not and it is unclear whether in the SA context non 
use will constitute beneficial use as is the case in Australia (McKay, 1999). That is 
Australian farmers retain licenses to unused water in spite of the condition that 




3. WATER  MARKETS 
 
Water can be priced either through (a) tradable water rights, (b) attempt to price 
at opportunity cost through administrative pricing or (c) some other costing such 
as actual operating cost. If water rights are transferable then the market attaches 
an opportunity cost to water which is the preferred strategy in international 
economic literature (Briscoe, 1997; Thobani, 1997; Anderson & Snyder, 1997; 
Livingston, 1995 and Howe, 1996). In the absence of a water market, the value of 
water is incorporated in the price of land and as no volumetric price is attached to 
water, no incentive exists to use water as a scarce resource. 
 
3.1  Price attached to consumptive or diverted use 
 
 In response to an increase in the volumetric price of water the farmer may:  
 
(a)  shift to crops that are more water efficient or higher valued,  
(b)   continue with the same crop and acreage and apply less water, or  
(c)   more water saving technology could be applied by moving from flood to 
drip irrigation.  
 
Attaching a price to the volume of water applied may not reduce the 
consumption of water as no water is saved by adopting water saving 
technologies (point (c) above) according to some experts (Huffaker & Whittlesey, 
1995 and Frasier, 1998). These experts contend that increased on-farm efficiency 
such as use of water saving technology creates the illusion of water conservation 
when, in reality, the consumptive (water taken up by plants) use of water may 
increase. In a hydrologic system, water not taken up by the plant will be returned 
to the basin or aquifer and be available for other users. Allowing farmers to 
irrigate a larger area if they use water saving technology such as drip irrigation 
leads to lower return flow and increased consumptive use of water. This is 
expected to happen in South Africa as farmers along the Sunday’s and Lower 
Orange rivers are permitted to irrigate a larger area if water saving technologies 
are adopted (Armitage & Nieuwoudt, 1999). Citrus farmers along the lower 
Sundays River have switched almost entirely from flood to drip irrigation. Apart 
from the water saving from drip irrigation the main reason appears to be that 
flooding creates water logging which can be a problem in citrus orchards. 
 
If the consumptive use increases then less water will be for other users. Although 
the opportunity cost price attached to the volume of irrigation water applied is 
increased in this case consumptive use is expected to increase. However, if a price 
is attached to consumptive use then the incentive will be given to economise on 




The transfer of water out of a system may affect other users of waters who are 
parties outside the transaction. While other users may be better off as a result of 
water trade, the concern is with them being adversely affected. These users may 
be (i) other consumptive users of water (such as farmers down stream) (ii) other 
non consumptive users such as the environment while (iii) the quality of the 
return flow may be affected. 
 
3.2  Other consumptive water right holders 
 
The transfer of water rights to another user may impact negatively on down 
stream users who are depended on the return flow of the previous use. Changes 
in the pattern of water use may affect other holders of water rights if their rights 
depend on existing patterns of use (GAO, 1994). Water may no longer reach their 
farms or it can not be taken out by original structures.  Under Colorado water law 
a transfer may not cause injury to other parties (no damage principle) and other 
senior water right holders (irrigations) can legally prevent transfer in the event of 
injury. To simplify the implementation and enforcement of the no injury rule the 
consumptive use rule was created to protect off stream water users. Under this 
rule only the consumptive use of water can be transferred. Although information 
on consumptive use is more difficult to obtain than on actual use it solves the 
problem of avoiding injury on other consumptive users (for instance farmers). 
The difficulty in measuring consumptive use and return flow significantly 
increases the transaction cost of this system (Young, 1998b).  However, if 
consumptive use rights are transferred other consumptive users are not harmed 
and even costlier litigation is avoided (Young, 1998b). Therefore in most states in 
the Western USA, water rights are based on consumptive use (water consumed 
by plant), with protection of third party rights to return flows. Transferring 
consumptive use rights may entail setting river basin and regional standards for 
the consumptive use of water per irrigated acre based on crop type, historic water 
availability, and other local variables. Such standards should be flexible enough 
to account for variations in water availability and local conditions. These data 
should be developed by the buyer and seller and third parties should not have to 
develop the data. 
 
3.3  Other non consumptive right holders (instream and environmental uses 
and users) 
 
The consumptive-use rule was not designed to protect non consumptive uses 
s u c h  a s  i n s t r e a m  u s e s  f r o m  i n j u r y  d u ring the transfer process. The most 
significant externalities are associated with recreational and environmental water 
values and with water quality.  Benefits generated by instream flows are often 




non-rivalry and non-excludability.  
 
If a water right is transferred from down stream to up stream, then stream flow 
will be less below the new diversion (up stream) point if the buyer is a farmer or 
other consumptive (i.e. urban) user. Reductions in instream flows may impact 
negatively on the environment or aquatic wildlife (GAO, 1994). If transfers are 
conditioned by the ‘no damage’ principle, instream rights are secure but 
flexibility in transfers is sacrificed. The flexibility by being able to transfer a water 
right adds value to it because the market value of a right reflects not only the 
value of current use but also that of future opportunities.  
 
The impact of transfers on instream flows that are not protected by water rights 
may or may not be considered during a transfer hearing in the Western USA, 
depending on the state. Whether this will change in future is unknown. 
 
3.4  Water quality 
 
Most water diverters are not required to take into account the deterioration in 
water quality they impose on the stream. It is estimated that the Grand Valley 
Irrigation Project in Western Colorado was contributing 10 tons of salt to the 
Colorado River per irrigated acre per year (Howe, 1998). 
 
In Colorado, the extension service is charged with the adoption of voluntary Best 
Management Practices (BMP) by educating farmers on the level and timing of 
nitrogen in order to meet but not exceed crop uptake. At present penalties are 
uncertain and Livingston and Cory (1998) conclude that state initiated 
monitoring with meaningful fines are required. Enforcement effort should further 
be targeted on soils susceptible to leaching. 
 
In the Eastern Cape in South Africa the return flow of irrigation water is so highly 
polluted in the Fish and Sunday’s rivers that the return flow is not suitable for 
irrigation. The writer visited this area in 1998 and 2000. The Department of Water 
Affairs regularly flushes these rivers by releasing water from the Orange River. 
The water from the Sunday’s River is not fit for human consumption in Port 
Elizabeth due to high pollution levels according to the city’s water engineering 
department and treatment costs are high. 
 
How to provide incentives to farmers to reduce pollution is problematic. A 
pollution tax (“Pigovian”) on water applied in these resource sensitive areas may 
be considered. In the above situation the tax may be based on additional cost of 
water used to flush the system plus the treatment cost of the Port Elizabeth 








Considering equity is an essential feature of a water market. In developing 
countries, equity is usually studied in terms of the distribution of benefits to 
small and larger farmers (Sampath, 1992). In the Western USA equity is often 
seen in terms of the equitable apportionment of interstate waters between states 
(Howe, 1996) while the USA Congress freed Native American tribes from 
obligations to repay any of the capital costs of constructing federal irrigation 
projects (Young, 1998a).  
 
It is essential that South Africa addresses the equity issue as it would provide 
more stability to the social fabric of society and the new Water Act is evidence 
that the government is serious in its commitment. Constitutional changes are 
aimed at empowering previously disadvantaged communities and it is certain 
that in all future projects welfare implications will be considered. These 
communities need protection in a water market as water may move from 
impoverished areas to farmers more able to buy it. 
 
Howe (1996) and Sampath (1992) conclude that both equity and efficiency may be 
promoted in a water market. It is however, questionable, whether small-scale 
farmers in South Africa will gain more water through market forces because of 
capital and technological constraints. Although these communities may not be 
able to compete with commercial agriculture in a market for water, leasing of 
water within the community may promote higher value use. 
 
The value of water is incorporated in the price of land and more equitable access 
to water will be provided in South Africa through the redistribution of land 
programme.  
 
3.6  Opportunity cost pricing  
 
A main problem with opportunity cost pricing is that the supply and demand of 
water are seasonal and variable and opportunity costs vary accordingly and can 
not be estimated. A further problem is that water needs to be metered. 
Opportunity costs are also subjective and can not be objectively observed. 
 
The market solution to price water at opportunity costs is tradable water rights. A 
discussion follows of lessons from the market institutions for tradable water 
rights in the Western USA and particularly as it relates to the Northern Colorado 




4.  LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN WATER MARKETS 
 
Water markets may encounter ideological opposition as water traditionally has 
been regarded as a public good.  The Colorado example shows that a market can 
develop for the usufructuary rights of water while water itself remains public 
property. The highly transferable Colorado-Big Thomson water is owned by the 
US Government. This is important for South Africa as according to the new 
Water Act, the South African Government will act as the custodian of the nation’s 
water resources and its powers in this regard will be exercised as a public trust. 
The Colorado example also shows that a water market implies both government 
involvement and active water user participation. The government can assist in 
institutional support but water needs to be managed at the lowest appropriate 
level.  
 
Farmers in South Africa pay water rates on listed area whether or not water is 
used. This policy has merit and should be continued as it allows the state to 
recover some of its expenditure. Also under riparian ownership in South Africa, 
farmers have the incentive to claim water rights on land that is not under 
irrigation and which may not really be suitable for production, and payment of 
water rates will reduce the incentive to do so. According to the new Water Act 
the non use of water (sleeper rights) may not be seen as beneficial use and SA 
farmers may loose these water rights. This may be seen as confiscation especially 
as farmers have paid water rates in the past. The problem of sleeper rights also 
exists in Australian water markets (McKay, 1999). According to McKay (1999), the 
various state governments in Australia have not had the will to take sleeper 
rights away and rights are tradable. 
 
The policy in SA of paying water rates on listed area does not attach a scarcity 
value to water as water is not volumetric priced. Irrigation water is thus under 
priced in South Africa. Administrative pricing of water at opportunity costs will 
not be successful as opportunity cost varies during the season based on water 
availability and therefore can not be calculated. In a water market water is not 
priced by administrators but the market attaches an opportunity cost price to 
water and promotes the highest valued use of the water. This has equity 
implications for the broader population as they benefit if agriculture uses water 
more economic efficiently, and releases water. In spite of the absence of legal 
institutional support, water markets have started to emerge in the Lower Orange 
River and in the Fish and Sunday's rivers in the Eastern Cape. Current ownership 
uncertainty of water in South Africa is not conducive to transfers and trading 
along these rivers stopped (Armitage & Nieuwoudt, 1999).  
 




South Africa. The first reason is that the only water trades that have taken place 
in these rivers are between non-users of water (sleeper rights) and intensive users 
(Armitage & Nieuwoudt, 1999).  The equity objective of releasing water for urban 
use is at present not being promoted in South Africa and it may take time before 
all sleeper rights are activated. 
 
The second reason is that transferring diverted use of water in agriculture does 
not attach a price (opportunity cost) to the use of water (consumptive use). 
Agricultural water is thus not released for urban use in spite of the higher 
opportunity cost price. The transfer of diverted use (water actually applied) 
provide irrigators the incentive to irrigate larger areas by adopting technologies 
that reduce application rates. The result is that the consumptive use of water 
increases and water prices thus do not promote water conservation. This is the 
case in South Africa that diverted use is transferred and that irrigation farmers 
are permitted to irrigate larger areas if they adopt water conservation 
technologies such as drip irrigation.  Administrative volumetric pricing of 
diverted use of water will also not promote water savings in agriculture for the 
same reason.  
 
In the Western USA water is transferred based on consumptive use to protect 
other consumptive users who may be harmed by diminished return flow if water 
is diverted from a fully appropriated stream. An exception is Colorado-Big 
Thomson water where transfers are on diverted use. The reason is that this water 
is imported into the region (new water) and no third party claims exist on this 
water. Non consumptive uses such as instream uses, however, need to be 
protected from injury during the transfer process. The most significant 
externalities are associated with recreational and environmental water values and 
with water quality. Environmental issues have become more prominent in the 
Western USA and a trade off exists between security of environmental rights and 
flexibility of water transfers as protection of instream rights will constrain 
transfers.  
 
Although water trades from down to up stream may reduce instream flow and 
harm the environment the more usual trades are in the opposite direction which 
will benefit the environment. Institutions need to be created in South Africa 
facilitating trades while providing protection to the environment. The new South 
African Water Act gives prominence to third party (environment and human 
needs) issues and in this context third parties are more protected under South 
African law than in the USA.  
 
Water engineers have played a major role in water markets in the USA and in 




nature. The findings of the State Engineer are usually accepted by all parties in 
Western States while water courts have delayed the process and made it 
expensive. Poor communities may also not find it financially feasible to contest 
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